The progressive decline of 3D printing pioneers

AM Survivor #18

Long time ago, there was a Polish company called Vobis. It sold computers and all kinds of related accessories. In the 1990s and 2000s, it was a synonym for professionalism and quality in computer retail.

I had the opportunity to collaborate with Vobis on a major advertising campaign in 2007. I still remember the confidence and pride radiating from the company’s marketing managers, stemming from the strong market position they held at the time.

Vobis had a network of prestigious computer stores across the country, staffed with highly knowledgeable advisors. Customers came in to talk to them, find out which computer would best meet their needs, and simultaneously learn everything about peripheral devices.

But only a portion of them actually made a purchase.

Most customers - once they had gathered the necessary knowledge - would go home and order a cheaper version of the same equipment online.

Vobis, therefore, acted as an educator and guide, but the financial benefits of this education were reaped by others. Ultimately, the chain could not withstand price competition and went under in the early 2010s, despite its invaluable role in popularizing computers.

Unfortunately, a similar scenario is now unfolding in the 3D printing market.

Companies that spent years educating consumers and laying the foundations of the industry now face difficulties because their business models cannot keep up with market changes.

A new generation of sellers is benefiting from their efforts, yet it is they who capture the majority of the profits. A paradox emerges: those who created the market are now struggling to survive, while newcomers join later and scale their businesses under completely new rules.

3D Printing Pioneers – education, growth, and high margins

3D printing has always been a technology requiring substantial knowledge and patience. Printers were expensive, and their operation was far from intuitive.

Specialized distribution companies stepped in to educate customers. They ran training sessions, prepared educational materials, advised on equipment selection, and solved technical problems.

Their work was almost mission-driven - they didn’t just sell 3D printers; they explained what 3D printing was, its applications, and its potential.

The printers available at the time - MakerBot, Zortrax, Ultimaker, BCN3D, and Raise3D - were expensive but offered relatively high margins. Companies selling these devices could operate successfully by selling just a few dozen units per month. The high margin compensated for the relatively low sales volume.

This model worked effectively for many years—the market grew, and specialized companies had stable conditions to invest in customer support and technical development.

The New Wave – affordable 3D printers and mass sales

Today, however, the 3D printing market looks completely different. Consumers are more informed and no longer need intensive education. A few YouTube reviews or online opinions are enough for them to make a purchase decision.

New brands have emerged - Bambu Lab, Creality, Elegoo - that offer 3D printers that are much cheaper, easier to use, and available immediately.

Prices are attractive, but consequently, margins for resellers are much lower. This means that to make significant profits, sellers need to move hundreds, not just dozens, of units per month.

This new model favors entirely different companies.

Purely commercial players, previously selling consumer electronics or industrial equipment, have entered the AM market.

They have experience in large-scale sales, excellent logistics, broad distribution channels, and the ability to reach thousands of customers simultaneously.

These companies now sell 3D printers by the hundreds or even thousands each month. In doing so, they rely on the groundwork laid by the original specialist companies—those that for years educated the market on why 3D printing is valuable and how to use it.

The paradox of desktop 3D printing success

The paradox today is that companies which built the market and educated customers now find themselves trapped. They still sell a few dozen printers per month, but it’s no longer enough.

High margins on expensive equipment have virtually disappeared because fewer people are willing to buy devices costing several thousand dollars when cheaper models from China offer similar or even higher quality.

Meanwhile, margins on inexpensive devices are so low that selling a few dozen units per month no longer sustains dynamic growth. At best, it allows survival - but without prospects for investment or expansion.

On the other hand, new players - large online stores or electronic equipment distributors - don’t need to educate the market. They can simply sell products at scale, leveraging established logistics and marketing infrastructure.

For them, 3D printers are just another product in their catalog, not a mission.

Consumers who once relied on the expertise of small specialist firms now buy from large sellers because it’s cheaper and faster.

Who will win the customer battle?

History repeats itself. Just as Vobis lost out to online competition, 3D printing pioneers today struggle to navigate the new reality.

Market education was their greatest asset, but now that customers are already informed, that advantage has diminished. High margins on premium equipment are no longer the norm, and without the ability to sell at scale, survival becomes difficult.

It was precisely the work of these companies that made 3D printing widespread and allowed the market to mature.

Yet now, the benefits are harvested by others - big players who arrived later and can operate under a new model.

Pioneers who created the market are not always able to sustain it once it enters the mass-consumption phase.