It was never about 3D printing
3DP War Journal #93
Nano Dimension - a company that developed its own proprietary 3D electronics printing technology - has sold that very technology. It’s a bit like Microsoft selling Windows, or META selling Facebook.
Alright, let’s be serious. That comparison is as ridiculous as it is pathetic.
Nano Dimension’s technology is indeed highly unique and fascinating - but also so niche that, at any given moment, perhaps only a few dozen people worldwide are actually using it.
And yet, for a time, Nano Dimension was one of the wealthiest companies in the AM sector and one of its key players.
During its heyday in 2020–2021, Nano Dimension raised $1.5 billion in capital, briefly reaching a staggering valuation of around $3 billion.
Its impact on the industry was so significant that one could argue it initiated and accelerated the AM industry crisis of 2024-2025.
Although, to be fair, saying Nano Dimension did it is somewhat misleading. It was Yoav Stern - the company’s CEO at the time - who fully earned the title of the most polarizing figure in the AM industry.
It was Stern who decided to acquire a 15% stake in Stratasys, and then attempted a full takeover.
It was Stern who torpedoed Stratasys’ acquisition of Desktop Metal.
It was Stern who later acquired that same heavily criticized Desktop Metal, and then added Markforged - a direct competitor with which it had been in conflict.
It was Stern who drew the attention of serious financial analysts to the AM industry. Intrigued by this chaos, they began analyzing it closely - only to discover that the entire industrial AM sector was essentially a massive speculative bubble.
This resulted in a shift in sentiment and a retreat of investors from the AM sector. Consequently, the money faucet was turned off, and companies began to collapse like a house of cards.
Just as Ric Fulop, Benny Buller, and Phil DeSimone helped ignite the great hype around industrial 3D printing (what I called the Third Era of AM - Mass Additive Manufacturing), Yoav Stern was the one who took it to the next level.
Unfortunately, at the same time, he created a completely disorganized corporate monster - one that even Avi Reichental in his 3D Systems days circa 2014 wouldn’t have been ashamed of.
Stern’s story ended abruptly on December 26, 2024. He was replaced by interim CEO Julien Lederman, then by Ofir Baharav, and finally by the current CEO - Dave Stehlin.
I described this carousel of CEOs here:
During this period of executive turmoil, most of Desktop Metal’s assets were sold off (ExOne went to Anzu Partners, which merged it with voxeljet, while the remnants of EnvisionTEC were acquired by SprintRay), and unprofitable companies with no prospects for recovery were shut down (Admatec, DeepCube, Fabrica, and Formatec).
Nano Dimension decided to focus on developing its proprietary AME (Additively Manufactured Electronics) product line and on Markforged - the only company in its portfolio whose products were still actively used.
This didn’t make much sense either, as it’s hard to imagine two more different technologies. And apparently someone finally realized this, because AME (bundled with the remnants of the defunct Fabrica) was sold for next to nothing to Inspira Technologies.
I wrote about it here:
From a day-to-day business perspective, this move is difficult to justify. The company is shedding its technological identity for a laughable $2 million (with an additional $10.5 million contingent on the product line generating expected revenue within a year).
Setting aside the entire AME legacy developed over more than a decade - Fabrica alone was acquired in 2021 for $54 million.
What remains is a stagnating Markforged, along with Digital Metal - acquired as part of the same deal and largely forgotten. There’s also Global Inkjet Systems, which doesn’t fit the current structure at all.
At first glance, this almost looks like acting against the company’s own interests.
Unless, of course, something else is going on. Joris Peels published a very interesting analysis on 3DPrint.com, which I recommend reading. Without repeating his arguments, in short, this move could mean:
Nano Dimension wants to sell Markforged, settle with shareholders, and call it a day.
Nano Dimension wants to sell itself entirely, and this is simply pre-acquisition cleanup.
A third scenario is also possible: Nano Dimension continues operating as Markforged and attempts to regain its former market position. But this seems the least likely, given how easily the company disposed of its core business. If there were a real strategic plan behind it, the sale price would certainly have been higher.
$2 million is a symbolic price. If someone were serious about operations, they wouldn’t sell at all - they’d wait for a better opportunity. So I would go for first or second scenario.
But all these considerations about Nano Dimension lead to a broader, more fundamental question: what was this all about from the very beginning?
I’ll be the one to say it out loud - even though everyone in the industry knows it:
This was never about 3D printing. It was always about money.
And not healthy money generated from operations - no. Just money. Any money. From anywhere. Free money.
Not from work - but from investors, institutions, governments.
Dude, it doesn’t matter. Just take it!
The industrial AM crisis has two sources - two dimensions:
The first is the niche nature of the solutions. A founder creates a unique manufacturing method unlike anything seen before. It has applications in very specific conditions and is used for highly specialized cases. It’s interesting - even exciting - but there’s little demand for it. On top of that, it’s expensive (since it involves producing individual machines), requires specialist knowledge to operate, and is ultimately unscalable.
The second is the pursuit of free money. A founder promises technological revolutions their company cannot deliver. In the early stages, they raise funds to develop that promise. Then, once the capital grows large enough, they use it to acquire other companies - essentially buying “growth” and “revenue.” Their original business cannot generate enough income to justify the investment, so they build a patchwork organization whose combined revenues are meant to do so.
This second scenario describes Nano Dimension - but also Desktop Metal (and earlier, 3D Systems under Reichental).
Now, one might think that the first case is about 3D printing, while the second is only about money. Not true.
In both cases, it’s about the same thing - just approached differently. In the first, through originality no one wants. In the second, through promises of world-changing impact that are impossible to achieve.
Those who achieve real market success focus on something else entirely: user value.
As long as a product meets user needs, it will be bought. Users don’t buy technology because it’s cool, unique, or never seen before. They certainly don’t buy it to increase shareholder value.
They buy it because:
they need it
it’s affordable to buy and operate
it’s easy to use
it’s reliable and repeatable
it’s scalable if needed.
So tell me - how many of these criteria did Nano Dimension meet?
For 3D printing to be viable, it must be accessible and approachable.
A company developing a product line must focus first and foremost on the end user. It must solve their problems and meet their expectations.
It must make its customers better. A better human being. I wrote about this here:
At Nano Dimension and other industrial AM companies, it was always about something else. Either technological self-indulgence, or increasing shareholder value. The end user was merely a slide in an investor presentation.
That’s why - and only why - these companies have failed or are in crisis. Because they refuse to understand that 3D printing is not about machines, materials, or software.
It’s about the user - and how they feel when using a 3D printer.
Excellent analysis Pawel. As usual.